Michael Moore's finances in robust health

Michael Moore's finances in robust health

The 'Sicko' director has an unprecedented deal for the documentary's profits, which he says ensures his continued independence.

By John Horn
Times Staff Writer
L.A. Times

June 29, 2007

MICHAEL MOORE'S "Sicko" focuses on how profit motives keep Americans from receiving quality medical care. But health insurance companies aren't the only ones in the documentary with revenue at stake: Moore himself stands to make a mint on the film.

Thanks to a lucrative contract negotiated with the Weinstein Co. by his talent agent, Endeavor's Ari Emanuel, Moore is in line to receive 50% of "Sicko's" gross profits — arguably one of the most lucrative deals on Hollywood's books, richer even than those enjoyed by the likes of Tom Cruise, Julia Roberts and director Peter Jackson. After theater owners have taken their cut, in other words, "Sicko's" profits will be split in half between Moore and Harvey and Bob Weinstein, whose Weinstein Co. is releasing the film nationally today.

And that's not the only place Moore's deal eclipses almost all other movie deals. While most actors and directors get a cut calculated on 20% of a film's DVD revenue, Moore's cut of those earnings is calculated based on all of the DVD proceeds. Of course, since Moore's documentaries take in far less than most big-studio movies, his bigger slice is of a much smaller pie.

The ramifications of that loaded deal are not lost on the filmmaker, particularly since "Sicko" is arguably his most populist film yet.

"It's a really interesting irony for me," Moore says, as his chauffeured Lexus SUV (a hybrid) steers through afternoon traffic on the filmmaker's return from a taping of "The Tonight Show With Jay Leno."

While some filmmakers' wealth can make their films seem elitist, Moore argues that his moviemaking and financial accomplishments actually have allowed him to remain even more focused on the real world.

"What it should do to me is remind me every single day that I have an even greater responsibility to do good with the success that I have been blessed with," Moore says. "I need to make sure that I am able to make the next film with the money that I have made on this film."

By being financially independent, Moore says, he is insulated from the corporate pressures that might try to dilute his impassioned documentaries, which include "Roger & Me," "Bowling for Columbine" and the Oscar-winning "Fahrenheit 9/11."

"The money allows me to never have to give in, never compromise," says Moore, wearing his trademark T-shirt, jeans and windbreaker, his Michigan State baseball hat off for the moment. "Nothing can ever be held over my head in the sense of, 'If you don't do this, we won't give you your money!' 'Oh, wow, I guess I'll be in really bad shape, won't I?'

"That's an enormous bit of freedom that I have — to stay completely true to the things I believe in. But I have an even greater responsibility because I have been blessed with that great success. I challenge myself with that, constantly."

During Moore's visit to Los Angeles this week, it was easy to see the different worlds in which he moves. On Monday night, he unveiled "Sicko" at an outdoor screening in front of 200 homeless people on skid row. The next night, he introduced the film to some of the town's richest residents at the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences' theater in Beverly Hills.

Moments after sitting on Leno's "Tonight Show" couch, Moore mingled with the production crew, several of whom shared their healthcare horror stories and asked what they could do to improve the nation's healthcare system.

Moore says he had not been prepared for that kind of reaction. He knew that nearly everybody had their own horrible insurance tales — he received 25,000 e-mails when he solicited such stories — but he didn't expect that "Sicko" would encourage so much activism.

"Certainly, the No. 1 question I get asked is, 'What can I do?' " Moore says. "I am not prepared for that. Because I am not leading a movement to revolutionize the healthcare system in America. I am making a movie. I have spent a year and a half making this film, and this is my contribution."

Unlike most other filmmakers who decry piracy, Moore says he doesn't really mind that "Sicko" was available for unauthorized Internet downloading well before the film was released theatrically — even though it has taken money right out of his pocket.

"Harvey [Weinstein] cares deeply," Moore says. "But I want people to see it, and I believe information and art should be shared. I don't believe I am the owner of that. Now, I don't think you have the right to download my work and sell it for a profit. But I just disagree with this whole concept that sharing is bad."

"If Harvey were sitting here, he'd say, 'Well, you'd make less money.' And I'd say, 'That's exactly right. Because I don't need to make all the money I make.' "

Moore says his first-class travel, accommodations and car service are not his choice, or even his preference (the latter statement has been disputed by some people who have worked with him).

"Harvey pays for all this," he says. "I would never stay at the Four Seasons, with all due respect to the Four Seasons. If I were coming out here on my own, I would never stay there. They pay for that because that's the workplace and I'm working and we do the junket there."

People who resent his wealth, Moore says, are not generally working-class stiffs like himself who have moved into the upper class. "When one of us succeeds, we're happy about that. We don't begrudge that. The begrudging that comes from my success or my financial success comes from people who grew up in a little nicer home and somehow didn't get the same break that I was fortunate enough to get in this business. So they are embittered."

Moore says he still likes living in Michigan and the friends he has there. If money has changed him, he says, why haven't his movies changed too?

Eighteen years ago this September he was sent first-class tickets to come out here and promote "Roger & Me." "So look at the films in between," he says as his driver pulls into the Four Seasons driveway, "and ask yourself if any of that has really mattered."

¿Crisis energética o institucional?

¿Crisis energética o institucional?

Por: Enrique Blasco Garma
Ámbito Financiero

Desde hace mucho tiempo los expertos en energía vienen pronosticando problemas y desacuerdo con las decisiones gubernamentales en la materia. Los empresarios también sabían que se avecinaban cortes de suministro. En realidad a nadie debe sorprender que el control estatal de los servicios públicos lleve a racionamiento, faltantes y cortes sorpresivos.

Esa fue la experiencia argentina desde que se estatizaron esos servicios, a mitad del siglo pasado, hasta que el régimen estatal eclosionó en el colapso eléctrico de 1989, la falta de servicios y las cuantiosas pérdidas de las empresas estatales financiadas con emisión monetaria e hiperinflación. El colapso fue rápidamente superado con la privatización, en la vilipendiada década de los 90, cuando el suministro creció tanto y los costos de la energía se redujeron tanto que la Argentina comenzó a exportarlos vigorosamente.

A nadie debiera sorprender que el año tenga estaciones climáticas, con variaciones de temperatura, luz solar y precipitaciones. Ni que los equipos generadores y de transmisión sufran desperfectos y salidas de servicio, en previsión de lo cual se constituyen reservas suficientes. Tampoco parece sorpresivo que la recuperación de la economía genere aumentos de la demanda de esos servicios. En los últimos diez años numerosos países crecieron más que el nuestro y no sufren carencias del servicio.

# Historia

El tema importante es cómo enfrentar el faltante de energía de la forma más económica posible para toda la sociedad. La historia argentina y la experiencia internacional confirman que la administración pública nunca provee los mecanismos idóneos para la provisión de bienes y servicios de calidad al menor costo. Si alguno no está convencido, que repase la caída del régimen soviético. La función del Estado es fundamentalmente administrar la fuerza pública para afianzar los frutos de la libertad. En esa tarea, el Estado tiene una enorme ventaja comparativa, pero tampoco la ejerce eficazmente, confirma la inseguridad física y jurídica de los argentinos.

Existen dos alternativas para enfrentar los conflictos. Las sociedades rezagadas buscan culpables. Los sacrificios rituales de las culturas ancestrales atestiguan una manera poco productiva de resolver dificultades, aunque satisficiera a sus dirigentes. Esa ideología para enfrentar algunos conflictos perdura en las naciones subdesarrolladas, en América latina, Africa, Medio Oriente, Asia, donde dirigentes políticos populares se aprovechan para ganar poder, aunque los pueblos se empobrezcan. En vez de enfrentar los problemas de la convivencia para ventaja de su gente, reparten culpas, inventan ideologías y rehacen la historia para descalificar a sus adversarios. La «herencia recibida» es una de sus muletillas preferidas. En cambio, las sociedades progresistas son ricas porque oyen verdaderamente a sus pueblos y sinceramente les importa superar los continuos conflictos de la forma más eficaz para el conjunto.

Con esa finalidad, las comunidades han ido erigiendo una estructura institucional para que la gente se comunique de la forma eficaz para consensuar las conveniencias recíprocas de coordinar las actividades individuales mediante un orden confiable. La confianza que conlleva previsibilidad de reglas de juego estables, no sujetas a humores transitorios, es la base de los grandes acuerdos sociales que posibilitan el éxito de los países. A los caudillos no les agrada ese sistema, porque la previsibilidad devalúa los resortes de su poder redistribuidor.

En verdad, la discusión energética es sobre quién tiene el poder de decisión. Si los individuos, coordinadas sus actividades por medio de instituciones -reglas de juego-creíbles o los caudillos. En la Argentina el gobierno nacional se apropió de las decisiones en diversas áreas que estaban encargadas a empresas privadas y entes de regulación. Suprimir el sistema de decisiones privadas resulta en las actuales penurias. El hecho de que el sistema institucional sea frágil, pues no brinda seguridades para que las empresas y la gente desarrollen su labor, en libertad, con horizontes previsibles y ordenados, es la madre del malestar energético de hoy.

Pixar Cooks WithJoy, Inventiveness In 'Ratatouille'

A Comic Tour de Force
June 29, 2007

The French have a word to describe "Ratatouille," the tale of a provincial rat named Remy who becomes a great Parisian chef. The word is "génial." Not genial as in cheerful, though Pixar's latest animated feature is certainly that, but génial with an accent, as in brilliant, or inspired. The characters are irresistible -- why would anyone want to resist a hero who so gallantly transcends his rattiness? -- the animation is astonishing and the film, a fantasy version of a foodie rhapsody, sustains a level of joyous invention that hasn't been seen in family entertainment since "The Incredibles."
The uncommon denominator of both productions is Brad Bird, the writer-director-cum-field marshal who, once again, has led an army of artists and technicians in the making of a film that feels both personal and classic. There's the same unerring showmanship, which makes a complex story seem luminously logical, the same delight in hurtling motion, sophisticated comedy (which flatters kids and grownups alike) and copious detail. Instead of using the kitchen of a fancy French restaurant as a picturesque background, "Ratatouille" explores the workplace and its frenzied rituals -- as well as its intricate hierarchy -- with a screwball zest worthy of the sainted Julia Child. And Remy slices, dices and cooks with thrilling ingenuity that overcomes his dual deficits in standing and stature.
But is the world ready for a movie that sees an upwardly mobile rodent in a kitchen as a cause for celebration, rather than extermination? Once you've met the clean little rat in question, and registered the high preposterousness of the premise -- not to mention the elegance of the execution -- the answer is yes. Remy is a born foodie: "If you are what you eat, I only want to eat the good stuff." And he's a dreamer who uses his highly refined sniffer to follow his bliss. What makes him so endearing, though -- and surely winning to kids -- is that he's a quintessential outcast, an underrat who's first reviled by the very people who come to lionize him.
When Pixar Animation Studios released "The Incredibles" in 2004, the company served notice that its computer animation techniques could rival or excel much of the action in live-action movies. Now Pixar, as part of Disney, has taken those techniques to new heights of virtuosity -- and new depths, during a vertiginous ride through the City of Light's sewers. (Although the complexities of fluid dynamics have posed formidable problems for animators, the results here are so convincing that you wonder if they cheated by pouring water into their computers.) "Ratatouille's" tour de force sequence turns on a partnership between Remy and the restaurant's dishwasher, a clueless, gangly kid named Linguini. The rat cooks by remote control as he rides, like a cross between a puppeteer and a mahout, inside Linguini's toque. Their wild dance is repeated a bit too often, but it's the funniest thing of its kind since Steve Martin's body was possessed by Lily Tomlin's spirit in "All Of Me."
The cast of characters is large, remarkably varied and wonderfully voiced, especially Ian Holm's Skinner, the restaurant's dwarfish, dictatorial head chef; Janeane Garofalo's Colette, a feminist chef with a passion to succeed in a milieu dominated by men, and Peter O'Toole's Anton Ego, a food critic of vulpine physique and acidulous demeanor. Anton is, as you might guess, an insufferable esthete, but he is also, bless his caustic soul, eager for new experiences. And so it falls to him to taste, and savor, the vegetable dish of the movie's title in a moment of comic revelation that is nothing short of sublime.

Persiste el luto

Edición Impresa del 26/06/2007

Persiste el luto

Ámbito Financiero

• Suspenden más de 3.000 trabajadores por falta de energía
• Caen los bonos hasta 3,5%. Temor por freno al crecimiento
• Insólito: el Presidente dice que todo iría mejor si no fuera por el periodismo

Se conocieron ayer más datos que complican al gobierno. La crisis energética está lejos de ceder y ya impacta a pleno en la economía. Trascendió que empresas, especialmente del interior, habrían suspendido más de 3.000 personas ante la imposibilidad de producir con las actuales restricciones de electricidad y gas. Si no llueve en el Comahue, dejará de operar Piedra del Aguila, agravando la situación. Se está importando cada vez más gasoil y fueloil para mantener la generación eléctrica de centrales. El mercado ya anticipa caída en la actividad: la Argentina fue el país que más bajó entre los emergentes. El cupón PBI cayó hasta 3,5% previendo esa menor actividad. Pero Néstor Kirchner no se hizo cargo; de hecho, para él la culpa es de la prensa: «Me quieren hacer perder de cualquier manera», bramó en la Casa Rosada, desligándose también de las dos derrotas que sufrió el domingo.

Por: Silvia Peco
Las distribuidoras de electricidad salieron ayer a controlar que grandes usuarios cumplan con topes impuestos por el gobierno en el consumo. Es el equivalente al promedio que utilizaron en 2005.
El gobierno sigue debatiendo internamente las medidas a tomar frente a la crisis energética que en este momento se centra en la electricidad. Ayer se mantuvo la restricción de 1.200 megavatios para industrias de todo el país en el horario de 16 a 24, y para hoy se anticipa la misma medida, aun cuando podría reverse al mediodía si hiciera falta.

De esta forma, Cammesa, la empresa mayorista mixta que controla el despacho eléctrico, suspendió por el momento el proyecto de aplicar todo el día un ahorro obligatorio a las industrias por 1.200 megavatios, cantidad equivalente a la que generan dos ciclos combinados de las centrales más actualizadas.

También por el momento sigue en estudio la resolución para que las distribuidoras eléctricas de jurisdicción nacional (Edenor, Edesur y Edelap) se responsabilicen de que las industrias grandes y medianas de sus áreas de concesión cumplan la restricción exigida por el gobierno, estimándose que ahora el nivel de adhesión ronda 70%.

La discusión gira sobre la posibilidad de que las distribuidoras puedan controlar efectivamente el consumo de las industrias. No hay por el momento un dispositivo que permita observar al momento cómo marcha el consumo caso por caso, de manera que si no se cumple la restricción, el único mecanismo posible es la inspección en cada planta, algunas de ellas con instalaciones internas, a las cuales se debería acceder con la compañía de la fuerza pública.

Una iniciativa que se estudia en la Secretaría de Energía es penalizar a las distribuidoras si no cumplen con la carga que tienen permitida, alternativa que produce aun más malestar en las mismas.

# Requisito

Cualquier decisión requiere además una resolución porque la que se está aplicando a industrias sólo contempla que las distribuidoras comuniquen a sus clientes la necesidad de bajar el consumo.

La Resolución 1.281, dictadapor Energía en octubre del año pasado, contempla que los usuarios con potencia contratada a partir de 300 kilovats (industrias, comercios, edificios de oficinas y de viviendas) deben consumir la misma cantidad de electricidad que en igual período de 2005, y que por el resto deben conseguir generación adicional.

Casi ninguna empresa cumplió con esa disposición, y finalmente la norma se aplica por 8 horas y en el volumenque se necesita para que el sistema no colapse. Las empresas tratan de evitar el costo de autogenerar energía, aunque también es cierto que no es fácil conseguir combustibles líquidos.

# Más racionamiento

Expertos creen que ya no hay posibilidades de sostener el sistema si no se toman medidas de racionamiento más extremas. Según se afirma, en Piedra del Aguila tienen agua para uno o dos días más, mientras El Chocón sería la única represa con reservas para continuar operando por unas dos semanas. La sequía ya es tal que se dice que con tres días de lluvia normal sería insuficiente para recomponer la situación en la zona del Comahue.

Por otra parte, las centrales térmicas funcionan a veces con gas, a veces con combustibles líquidos porque no tienencapacidad para almacenar fueloil o gasoil por varios días. Como históricamente las usinas son las primeras en no tener gas cuando baja la temperatura, se podría decir que parte de ese producto que le falta a la industria se está destinando a generar electricidad.

# Agua

Un dato es que en años anteriores había agua en las represas hidroeléctricas, por lo cual la exigencia sobre las térmicas era menor que ahora. Hoy, cada central necesitaría un barco de gasoil o fueloil por día para no usar gas, por lo cual cualquier retraso podría suscitar mayores problemas.

No es un problema de costos, porque el Estado termina haciéndose cargo de la diferencia de valores por producir electricidad con combustibles líquidos. Es, sobre todo, falta de depósitos para varios días.

Las industrias siguen reclamando al gobierno otras medidas para evitar que se les aplique un plan más restrictivo. Mencionan la posibilidad de apagar carteles luminosos en la vía pública o de imponer castigos severos a hogares por no ahorrar energía.

Pero al gobierno le cuesta tomar medidas que recuerden la crisis energética del gobierno de Raúl Alfonsín, y parece preferir el riesgo de que la salida intempestiva de una máquina derive en un apagón generalizado por barrio o ciudad.

Proof of Life

By MARY ANASTASIA O'GRADY
June 25, 2007 - Wall Street Journal

Maybe the Argentine electorate is not willing to march lock-step off a cliff behind the authoritarian socialism of President Néstor Kirchner after all.
That possibility was raised yesterday when Mauricio Macri of the center-right PRO party appeared to be on course to defeat Mr. Kirchner's minister of education, Peronist Daniel Filmus, in the Buenos Aires mayoral election runoff. Mr. Filmus was Mr. Kirchner's hand-picked candidate and the president mobilized every advantage of his office -- in a country where transparency is nearly nonexistent -- to favor his man. Even so, the Peronist faltered. As we went to press, the final results weren't in but exit polls suggested a strong Macri victory.
Pundits still expect either Mr. Kirchner or his wife, Cristina Fernández, to run in and win the October presidential election. But the failure of the president's proxy in the capital city ballotage yesterday suggests that his days of uncontested power are over. Argentine pluralism and democracy may be making a comeback, and none too soon.
That porteños -- as denizens of the port city are known -- said "no mas" to Mr. Kirchner yesterday is also a positive development for the cause of stability, peace and growth throughout South America. Only a decade ago Argentina had substantial geopolitical relevance, so much so that the U.S. qualified it as "a major non-NATO ally." But since Mr. Kirchner came to power in 2003, the country's international profile has been reduced to banana-republic status. It has allied itself with the menacing president of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, supported the anti-democratic agenda of Bolivian President Evo Morales, picked a nasty fight with its neighbor Uruguay, broken gas contracts with Chile and invested enormous political capital in skewering foreign investors. It is an understatement to say that Mr. Kirchner's Argentina has not been good for the region.
While Mr. Macri, who also happens to be the president of Argentina's championship soccer team the Boca Juniors, is considered "center-right," the city that just elected him cannot be classified as any such thing. In 2003 it elected the hard-left Aníbal Ibarra, who allied himself with the Kirchner wing of the Peronists. This time the vote has gone the other way and it's worth asking why.
Some are blaming the kirchnerista loss on Mr. Filmus's weak candidacy and the victory of the Boca Juniors last week at Latin America's most prestigious soccer tournament. Yet there is no denying that anti-Kirchner sentiment also played a role. With the president so actively involving himself in the campaign, the election became as much a referendum on the national government as it was a mayoral race.
Booming Argentine growth ought to have put strong winds at Mr. Filmus's back. But locals have been reminded in recent weeks -- by natural gas shortages in a winter that has started off unusually cold -- that perhaps all is not right with Mr. Kirchner's economic model. The government has had to ration gas supplies to industry and taxis in order to meet residential demand. This is putting pressure on business. Petrochemical, chemical and steel operations are all being affected. Reuters reported last week that three steel companies, which asked not to be identified, said layoffs were possible as a result of the energy shortages.
It would not be surprising if energy turns out to be only the canary in the coal mine of the Argentine economy. Scarcities do not occur in market economies because as supply is constrained prices rise, tempering demand; consumers can then get all they want at the new price level. More important, higher prices stimulate new supply as producers have a greater incentive to invest and innovate to bring product to market and get paid.
Since the end of 2001 the Peronist economic agenda has rejected these simple laws of the market in favor of economic populism. In December of that year, the government reneged on its debt, establishing an uncertain environment for capital that continues today. In 2002, it further alienated investors by abrogating utilities contracts and imposing price controls. These decisions were taken before Mr. Kirchner assumed the presidency but his government has made things worse by broadening the scope of the price controls and pursuing an almost irrational vendetta against the private sector, creditors and profits.
The Kirchner legacy has also spread an anti-property rights ideology throughout the country. Local legislatures in Catamarca and Corrientes provinces are now contemplating the seizure of ranch land owned by foreigners, reinforcing the message that investing in Argentina is a risky proposition.
The costs for this nonsense are now showing up. Consumers are hungry for a variety of artificially low-priced products, from gas to foodstuffs, but supply is going in the opposite direction as investors are nowhere to be seen. Ergo, shortages. In the energy sector the problem is particularly acute. Barclays Capital warned last week that "the inelasticity of supply in an industry whose output faces continued declining rates makes the lack of investment in exploration and production of oil and gas concerning." The country's "unorthodox economic policy framework might be reaching its limits," the report said. Shortages are also showing up in milk and other dairy products.
Still, the economy is on track to grow by at least 7% this year, which suggests that yesterday's anti-Kirchner vote may have been driven by other issues too. The list could include electoral disgust with a massive public-works corruption scandal, the firing of personnel who refused to "adjust" national inflation statistics, financial investigations of government adversaries and double-digit inflation. The president's penchant for alienating neighbors and his four-year effort to revive the divisiveness of the Dirty War have also invited much criticism from educated Argentines.
Whatever the cause, the Macri victory suggests cracks in a government machine that until now has handily steamrolled its opposition. The outcome in Buenos Aires might even point to a nascent but profound shift in Argentine politics.

Por una vez la opinión se impuso al aparato. ¿Durará?

Por una vez la opinión se impuso al aparato. ¿Durará?

Por: Ignacio Zuleta
Ámbito Financiero

La principal dificultad con la que se tendrá que ver Mauricio Macri desde la heterogeneidad del armado de su triunfo, es con el arco amplio y odioso de adversarios que creó en esta elección. Tuvo en contra al gobierno nacional, los animadores y opinadores de los medios y los funcionarios de todos los niveles, sumó la indiferencia del sector empresario -raro cuando quienes lo combaten le atribuyen ser un bastonero del mundo de los negocios- y de la economía. Esos adversarios lo miran como enemigo; para peor, no por lo que hace sino por lo que es. El primer empeño del ganador será convencer que él no es lo que es, sino lo que hace o puede hacer.

Lo de Macri es un raro episodio que quiebra una constante de la política argentina de estos años: el sistema electoral desenganchado del sistema de opinión. La frágil construcción política del macrismo parece haber vencido, por una vez, a la política de aparatos, que es la que instauró al actual gobierno nacional. El apartamiento de esa maldición de un país mortificado por gobiernos que fracasan, pero que se rehacen desde el poder para mantenerse con la promesa de que esta vez será distinto, es lo más alentador de la elección porteña de ayer.

Macri ha venido además a ofrecer un cambio que nadie sabe en serio si va a poder cumplir: no tiene experiencia de gestión y la marea que lo pone en el cargo de gobernador del distrito federal se nutre de los restos del naufragio (peronismo, radicalismo, conservadurismo, clericalismo, independientes). También ha venido a expresar la condición del ciudadano de estos tiempos: no quiere que nadie lo represente, sospecha de quien quiere gobernarlo, rechaza a quien quiere seguir gobernándolo.

***

Más una guerra florida que una elección que decidiera posiciones de poder, la victoria de Macri importa más por las señales que lanza que por el rumbo que puede darle a la política argentina hacia adelante. La primera es la respuesta del electorado porteño al agravio desde el gobierno nacional, que durante tres semanas dijo, a través de todos sus voceros, que se había equivocado en la primera vuelta.

El voto de la víspera fue otra oportunidad que tuvo el público de manifestar rechazo hacia el poder: Macri sumó más de 15 puntos a los 45,76 que sacó el 3 de junio. Calló Néstor Kirchner en las dos últimas semanas de la campaña, advertido de que si seguía abriendo la boca lo sepultaba más a Daniel Filmus. Pero dejó escrito el libreto a todas las bocinas del oficialismo: que no se equivoquen los porteños, que no lo conocen a Macri, que les van a subir los impuestos, que le van a privatizar todo, que va a echar a los empleados municipales, etc. Pese a ese mensaje, o gracias a él, se sumaron más de 250 mil porteños al apoyo de Macri, desafiando ese reto presidencial y afónico. Macri parece empujar al público más como estandarte del rechazo a todo lo que venga de arriba por encima de que lo considere un buen candidato a gobernarlo.

Es nuevo Macri, pero no es nuevo este ánimo desde que asumió Kirchner el gobierno. Primero fue la protesta de Juan Carlos Blumberg, después la elección legislativa de 2005 en la cual el oficialismo cosechó apenas 26,4% de los votos positivos, más tarde Cromañón, que volteó a gobernantes del kirchnerismo en el distrito vidriera del país, con fundamentos por lo menos discutibles en lo técnico pero apabullantes en lo político: fue otro capítulo del No de los sectores medios al ciclo duhaldo-kirchnerista. Esto presenta el resultado de ayer menos como una proeza de Macri que como un gesto de la muchedumbre cuando le dan una oportunidad de expresarse. Frente a eso, el gobierno nacional acumuló sellos de goma, funcionarios, locutores y artistas de medios oficiales u oficiosos, prensa adicta o que acompaña. La intención era la anunciada: poder decir hoy que Kirchner puede apoyarse en «el resto» que perdió la elección porteña, pero que no es el 23,75%, sino que arañó los 40 puntos.

***

El resultado agrava el drama de Kirchner como presidente de minorías; es de la estirpe de los mandatarios surgidos desde una derrota en las urnas y con el cargo ganado en la AFA. Le ocurrió a George W. Bush, calificado también como un «minority president» tras su derrota ante Al Gore en las urnas, y que pudo revertir en la Suprema Corte de su país. Las primeras escaramuzas de su gobierno, cuando casi hace estallar una guerra con China, y su cruzada después en Irak las han explicado los observadores como una forma de redimirse de ese pecado original.

También Kirchner surgió de una derrota ante Carlos Menem y con apenas 22% de los votos -la mayoría aportados además por su socio de entonces, Eduardo Duhalde-; su estilo agresivo de cazar elefantes en un zoológico (figura que consagró Elisa Carrió), la confrontación con un sector de la prensa a la que cree vocera del antiperonismo, su desdén por el voto de los distritos adversos, pagarle u$s 10 mil millones al FMI para que lo creyeran liberado de sus ordenanzas, son también gestos explicables por su necesidad de superar su nacimiento como un presidente de minorías. La elección de ayer no mejora esa condición en el segundo distrito del país en cantidad de votantes, y en el cual gobernó hasta abril del año pasado a través de Aníbal Ibarra. Le es difícil construir algo en la Capital, y por extensión en el resto del país, por la heterogeneidad de ese casi 40% que acumuló Filmus.

***

Toda construcción política es también negativa, como todo discurso político es un antidiscurso; la acumulación política no es sólo a partir de las afinidades positivas, se nutre de la negatividad del rechazo hacia el adversario. Esa negatividad tiene fuerza, lo que no tiene quizás es perduración en el tiempo, porque las negatividades evolucionan con el tiempo y anulan su eficacia.

Esto corre también para Macri, a quien la heterogeneidad del voto que lo apoyó es también un enigma en cuanto a construcción política. Lo sabe el ganador de ayer, que en su elección de 2003 fue acompañado por dirigentes que duraron poco a su lado y terminaron nutriendo a sus opositores; fueron diputados con él Jorge Argüello, Paola Spátola, legisladores Chango Farías Gómez, Florencia Polimeni y tantos otros que alimentaron luego al ibarrismo y al kirchnerismo. Como ha ganado le será más fácil retener adhesiones y seguramente no tendrá la dispersión de sus bloques legislativos que vivió después de 2003. Es una necesidad, además, en un distrito que viene de la experiencia perturbadora de la destitución de Ibarra como consecuencia de un acto de gobierno que le fue incriminado como descalificante para permanecer en el cargo. Macri alimentó esa destitución que fue posible porque Ibarra había desatendido la necesidad de contar con un bloque legislativo propio que frenase cualquier manotazo de la oposición para destituirlo, algo que sabe cualquier presidente cuando «pisa» la Comisión de Juicio Político con más celo que la de Presupuesto y Hacienda.

Contra lo que afirman desde el gobierno, nada más lejos de la intención de Macri de pronunciarse desde ahora como jefe de la oposición. Esperará, cuanto más, que eso se lo vaya armando en su derredor el fluir del tiempo y de los hechos. Cree, como el resto de la dirigencia política, que tiene que convivir con los Kirchner en la presidencia de la Nación durante su primer mandato por lo menos.

Quienes lo conocen creen que irá por la presidencia en 2011, si no lo voltea antes la silla eléctrica de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires. Un plan con el que suele bromear ante sus amigos es que dedicó diez años a las empresas -hasta 1995- diez años a Boca Juniors -terminó este año-y que dedicará los próximos diez años a la política. Desprecia las advertencias de quienes le dicen que es un oficio en el que se ingresa fácil pero del cual es casi imposible salir, salvo que uno se resigne a pasar una temporada en el infierno (los Tribunales). Como no es un político de profesión -aunque sabe comprar política en donde esté- cree en los péndulos (país a la izquierda, país a la derecha, en vaivén casi físico) y en los ciclos generacionales. De ahí saca la idea de que los Kirchner han de perimir con los años y que el cansancio propio, y el del público, más que la voluntad de los adversarios, los terminará sacando de la cancha.

South America's Rising Star

WSJ:
Argentina's Malbec Makes a Big Splash;Living With Success
June 22, 2007

Here's the wine world's equivalent of a man-bites-dog story: In the first four months of this year, the U.S. imported almost 50% more wine from Argentina than from its neighbor Chile. This represents a big change: As recently as 2000, Chile exported almost five times as much wine to the U.S. as Argentina did. Even just last year, Chile's imports were about one-third higher than Argentina's. But now, imports from Argentina are so strong that they've outstripped almost all other countries, and aren't far below the figure for France. We're sure there are many reasons for this related to trade policies and such, but to us it all comes down to one word: Malbec.

Malbec is Argentina's signature grape. Long ago, it was known as one of the classic blending grapes of Bordeaux, but now it's best known as a stand-alone varietal in Argentina. At its best, Malbec produces a wine of dark color, spicy blackberry-herbal intensity and crisp acidity in a medium-weight package. When we first wrote about Malbec in 1999, we had trouble getting enough for a blind tasting. How things have changed. Argentina in general, and Malbec specifically, are getting a tremendous amount of attention from the wine world these days. The people who make the famous Château Cheval Blanc in Bordeaux, for instance, now make a Cabernet Sauvignon-Malbec blend in Argentina along with a local winery, Terrazas de los Andes. Big, inky and age-worthy, it sells for around $70. In fact, even though Malbec is often inexpensive and a great deal, more high-end offerings are hitting the market, which indicates that Argentina's winemakers think Americans are familiar enough with the grape at this point to risk big bucks on something more intense and memorable.

A Crowded Shelf

For a few years, several reliable names -- Alamos, Altos Las Hormigas, Catena, Finca Flichman, Navarro Correas -- kept Malbec in the game in U.S. wine stores. But now they have lots of company. With so many Malbecs on shelves, we decided the time was right for a new tasting. We found so many so quickly that we scooped up 60 before we knew it; we could have easily added another 40. As always, we were not looking for "the best" Malbec from Argentina, but were trying to get an overall sense of what's out there. Has success spoiled Malbec?

Having finished the tasting, let's get right to the point: If you don't pick up a Malbec to pair with one of your cookouts soon, you're making a mistake. This is a special grape and this is a good time to be trying it.
They were not all winners, to be sure. The interesting herbal qualities of Malbec can't support any sweetness -- whether it's sugar or too much oak that gives the impression of sweetness -- and some of these proved that point too well. Others weren't ripe enough or they lacked acidity, leaving them fairly flat and a bit dull, with a jumble of indistinguishable tastes. But the overwhelming number of wines we tasted were winners. Whether they were among our very favorites or not, wine after wine looked and tasted black, with pepper, spices, earth and, on occasion, all sorts of other interesting tastes -- sometimes plums, sometimes chocolate, and sometimes chocolate-covered plums. Because they were easy to drink and often quite smooth, some reminded us why people first fell in love with Merlot. But these generally offered far more character than today's Merlot, with juicy fruit, an earthy underpinning and a clean finish.
Earthy and Rich
The very best of these were excellent wines, offering the kind of structure -- layers of flavors and focused tastes -- we associate with Bordeaux. Our best of tasting, from Felipe Rutini, was outstanding, with the kind of character that announced itself with every sip. It had good herbal qualities and hints of cedar, combined in an earthy, rich package. The importer, Pasternak Wine Imports of Harrison, N.Y., says 15,000 cases were made, and 5,000 were imported and distributed nationwide.
These wines are meant for food -- especially meat, but flavorful vegetable dishes like ratatouille as well. Even though they're dark and have intense tastes, they have lively acidity and real vitality, so they're not at all too heavy for summer. While it's impossible to know which one you might see at your store, chances are there will be at least a few, so pick one up. Or maybe two, to get a sense of what different winemakers are doing with this grape. Chances are they will have many similar characteristics, but taste different -- and good.
The Dow Jones Malbec Index
In a broad blind tasting of Malbec from Argentina, these were our favorites. As it turned out, all of our favorites are from the Mendoza region, which is a hot spot for Malbec. These are great with roasted meats and savory vegetable dishes. The better ones will age well for at least a couple of years.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Felipe Rutini2004
$17.99
Very Good/Delicious
Best of tasting. Classy, with the structure of a fine Bordeaux. Cedar, herbs and earth add up to a wine of stature, with a notably long, dry finish. Interesting, with real character. Easy to drink, but not at all simple. Everything is well-integrated.

Nieto Senetiner 'Reserva' 2004
$6.99
Good/Very Good
Best value. Blueberries and blackberries in an interesting, edgy package. Plenty of fruit and excellent balance, with a cleansing, lemony finish. Bring on the steak!

Bodegas Caro (Domaines Barons de Rothschild-Lafite and Nicolas Catena)2002
$41.99
Very Good
Classy, with structure, and light on its feet, with fresh fruit, great acidity and fine balance. Earthy, with a touch of chocolate.

El Felino (Vina Cobos)2004
$17.00
*Very Good
Very smooth, with plump, ripe blackberries, good spices and nice earth. Softer than many. Mild and easy.

Bodega Terrazas de los Andes 2006
$8.99
Good/Very Good
Earthy, with zingy acidity, especially at the end. Very lively, very real.

Alamos (Catena) 2006
$7.99
Good/Very Good
Rich, herbal and interesting, with plenty of character and an interesting hint of tar. Perennial favorite.
La Posta del Viñatero 'Angel Paulucci Vineyard' 2005
$17.97
Good/Very Good
Mellow and confident, with good fruit, a pinch of herbs and earth. Highly drinkable, with nicely balanced oak.

Susana Balbo (Dominio del Plata) 2005
$24.99*
Good/Very Good
Very dark, dense, black-cherry color prepares the way for a darkly intense, young wine. Rich, like concentrated blackberries. Reliable name.


NOTE: Wines are rated on a scale that ranges: Yech, OK, Good, Very Good, Delicious, and Delicious!

Todo sea por el bala

Todo sea por el bala

Por: Guillermo Laborda
Ámbito Financiero

«Vamos a estar desde la Capital a Rosario en 85 minutos», aventuró Néstor Kirchner ayer en el acto por el Día de la Bandera. Con la misma premura quiere que se concrete el proyecto del controvertido tren bala y ordenó a funcionarios de Felisa Miceli y de Julio De Vido que apuren todas las negociaciones pendientes. Hace 14 días viajaron a París Sergio Chodos y Alejandra Sharf (Secretaría de Finanzas) y ni la niebla en Ezeiza los detuvo: pese a la cancelación de todos los vuelos, el Tango 01 los depositó en San Pablo y allí conectaron a París.

El secretario de Transporte y Subsidios, Ricardo Jaime, ya estaba en esa capital. El consorcio Veloxia que lidera la francesa Alstom (rescatada de la debacle por el gobierno de su país) fue el ganador del proceso licitatorio que duró más de un año. Se trató de un triunfo solitario: Siemens no presentó una oferta por no contar con financiamiento para encarar el megaproyecto. Sugestivamente, Alstom se comprometió a cubrir con fondos propios y de Société Générale 75% de las inversiones necesarias.

Apostaban todo a que la Argentina iba a acordar una rápida salida del default con el Club de París, lo que les liberaría préstamos a baja tasa de bancos europeos. Perdieron.

A pesar de las extensas reuniones de Chodos y Sharf en Francia, no hubo avances en las negociaciones. Lo único que podría destrabar el curso es que el gobierno argentino permita a una misión del FMI auditar las cuentas públicas. Imposible: ya fue rechazado de inmediato una vez más por Néstor Kirchner.

Ahora, bajo la figura de «ingeniería financiera», se busca todo tipo de mecanismos para seguir adelante con el tren bala. Por ello es que en los últimos días en el Palacio de Hacienda se ven circulando más abogados que economistas. ¿Garantizará la Argentina la deuda de Alstom como ya se hiciera con la deuda de SanCor con Chávez? No se desmiente nada en Economía relacionado con esta iniciativa. No sólo el tren bala está en juego por el Club de París. Hay proyectos de inversión anunciados por Volkswagen esperando lo mismo.

Igual, por más anuncios que se hagan, avances significativos en la obra antes de las elecciones de octubre no serán fáciles. Tampoco ayuda que esté en el escenario Société Générale, una entidad con dificultades en Francia. No escapa Sergio Chodos al problema: ejecutivos franceses mantuvieron una fuerte discusión con el secretario de Finanzas por cómo obtener los fondos comprometidos.

Ayer, formalmente, Ricardo Jaime adjudicó las obras del tren bala al consorcio que capitanea Alstom y que está también integrado por la española Isolux y las preferidas argentinas IECSA y Emepa. Angelo Calcaterra, sobrino de Franco Macri, es el titular de IECSA, mientras que Emepa es de Gabriel Romero, de Chascomús, dueño de Ferrovías e Hidrovías. Todos unidos con un denominador común: una excelente relación con Néstor Kirchner. Faltan precios, valores, plata en suma, pero vale soñar con viajar a Rosario en 45 minutos, a 300 km por hora, que cubrirá con una frecuencia de tres trenes diarios. Si es rentable, no interesa. Si usuarios podrán pagar el boleto, tampoco.

No será tan rápido como la concreción del proyecto. Cuando se culmine la obra, la Argentina habrá ingresado en el G-7: sólo España, Corea, Japón, China, Francia Alemania e Italia cuentan con trenes de este tipo.

Western fictions, Arab realities

We want a peaceful, democratic Mideast, but are we the only ones?

Jonah Goldberg

June 19, 2007

I HAVE BEEN scouring EBay for the last couple of days, hoping to snag a one-of-a-kind item. But, alas, it hasn't turned up yet. I'm looking for the late Yasser Arafat's Nobel Peace Prize. It was looted from Arafat's Gaza compound by the victorious forces of Hamas, a jihadist group backed by Iran and Syria that has routed the once-mighty forces of Fatah from power in Gaza. According to the Jerusalem Post, a Fatah spokesman said: "They stole all the widow's clothes and shoes."

The widow in question would be Suha Arafat, Arafat's photo-op wife. Who can blame the looters for wanting to grab as much of her swag as possible? First of all, she wasn't using it. Suha hasn't been to Gaza for years. And her favorite shoe designer is Christian Louboutin, whose wares can fetch about $1,000 a pair, which is more than many Palestinians make in a year.

But it's that peace prize, won by Arafat and Shimon Peres for agreeing to the 1993 Oslo accords, that really captures the lunacy of it all. It's the perfect reminder for everyone, myself included, of the Arabs' refusal to yield to idealism, hope or good intentions — and the West's refusal to recognize reality.

"The genius of you Americans is that you never make clear-cut stupid moves, only complicated stupid moves which make us wonder at the possibility that there may be something to them which we are missing," former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser once said. But from the U.S. point of view, the Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity. Maybe they just don't want what we're selling?

For example, in 2005, Israel simply gave Gaza to the Palestinians. According to the "international community's" land-for-peace mantra, a peaceful society should have sprouted like a stalk from Jack's magic beans. Instead, nearly 49% of the Palestinian people voted for a band of Islamic fanatics — even the European Union calls them terrorists, not that it matters much — dedicated to the destruction of Israel. But the diplomacy-uber-alles crowd has long been immune to contrary evidence. Remember when Arafat fanned the second intifada in spite of a generous peace offer from the Israelis and brokered by President Clinton? Members of the Nobel committee openly talked of revoking the peace prize — from Peres.

And now, the editors of the New York Times, President Bush and the leaders of the EU all say that this is the moment for Israel to offer more concessions to Arafat's successor, Mahmoud Abbas. So much for the fresh-from-Iraq cliche that it's pointless to choose sides in a civil war.

Margaret Beckett, the British foreign secretary, lamented, "Once again, extremists carrying guns have prevented progress against the wishes of the majority who seek a peaceful two-state solution." But how do you square this with the fact that Hamas, the party promising the destruction of Israel, won the Palestinian elections in 2005? Meanwhile, the leaders of Fatah — the "moderates" — had not long ago set the standard for Israel-hatred themselves.

The great irony is that Hamas now labels members of Fatah as Jewish "collaborators," a designation that apparently justifies even the execution of wounded Fatah prisoners in hospitals.

The German foreign ministry went so far as to suggest that the triumph of Hamas — and the hardships it will cause civilians — are clear grounds for increasing aid to Gaza. It seems that if you choose terrorism, either at the ballot box or in the streets, the Europeans, like the good hands at Allstate, will be there to pay for the mess.

But there's another, perhaps more important, lesson to be drawn from the Hamas ascendancy. The Bush administration pushed for democracy in the Palestinian territories, and it got what it wished for — in spades. The assumption behind the push for democracy in Gaza and in Iraq is that Arabs can be trusted to handle political freedom. The Democrats who demand an immediate pullout from Iraq also hope that with democracy, the Iraqis will be able to figure out their problems themselves via some euphemistic "political solution." That is unless the antiwar Democrats are really advocating turning all of Mesopotamia into one giant Gaza Strip, the far more likely result of U.S. withdrawal.

For many disciples of the "international peace process," it's a matter of faith that the Palestinians just have to want peace, because how else can you have a peace process? For many supporters of the Bush Doctrine, Iraqis have to want democracy, because if they don't, what's the point of having a freedom agenda? But what if these are just beloved Western fictions? We see a well-lighted path to the good life: democracy, tolerance, rule of law, markets. But what if the Arab world just isn't interested in our path? As a believer in the freedom agenda, that's what scares me most.

Bill Gates's Charitable Vistas

By ROBERT BARRO
June 19, 2007

Bill Gates is the richest man in the world, helped create a revolutionary computer software company, and earlier this month collected an honorary degree from Harvard University. But he may not understand the vital role wealth creation plays in society.

In collecting his degree, Mr. Gates delivered a commencement address that focused not on the information age, the rise of personal computers or the relentless efficiency his software has brought to nearly every industry. Instead, he focused on his own personal philanthropy. His implicit theme was that so far what he has accomplished may have been good for him and Microsoft shareholders, but it has been no great contribution to society. He suggested that with a personal fortune of about $90 billion (including what he has transferred to his foundation) it is time for him to give something back.

I find this perspective hard to understand. By any reasonable calculation Microsoft has been a boon for society and the value of its software greatly exceeds the likely value of Mr. Gates's philanthropic efforts.

Here is a sketch of a simple model of Microsoft's social value. The market value of the company's stock recently hit $287 billion. In 2006, its revenue was $44 billion, with earnings of $13 billion. This money was generated by creating something consumers value. Only Microsoft's competitors could believe that this much market value, revenue and earnings would have been created by delivering products that have little value to society.

Suppose that a copy of a new version of Windows sells for $50 (and is typically charged as part of the price of a personal computer). Microsoft's revenue from Windows would then equal $50 multiplied by the number of copies consumers snap up. Microsoft's earnings are the revenue less production and development expenses. But that's not the social value. That comes from the increase in productivity created when businesses and households use the software. The social benefit equals the value of the extra product, less the total paid for the software. Almost by definition, the benefit has to be positive. Otherwise, why would consumers willingly pay for Windows?

A conservative estimate, in a model where software serves as a new variety of productive input, is that the social benefit of Microsoft's software is at least the $44 billion Microsoft pulls in each year. When capitalized with the same ratio (22) that the market applies to earnings, this flow corresponds to a valuation of $970 billion. Thus, through Microsoft's future operations, Mr. Gates is creating a benefit to the rest of society of about one trillion dollars -- or more than 10 times his planned donations. And this counts only the likely future benefits, giving no weight to the past.

Mr. Gates has pointed out that it's difficult to give away such a large sum of money in a productive way. This isn't exactly true. He could cut a $300 check to everyone in the U.S., or donate the money to the U.S. Treasury with the aim of reducing the national debt. The last method is easier but has different effects on income distribution.

But Mr. Gates's plan is, instead, to use the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to reduce world poverty, with an emphasis on advances in health. This is a noble goal. But it will likely just supplement the much larger existing programs of aid and debt relief that have been carried out for many years by international organizations and governments. These programs have, at best, a checkered record. Although Mr. Gates is probably smarter and more motivated than the typical World Bank bureaucrat, he likely won't do much better.

To find policies that are likely to alleviate poverty, it is best to look at actual successes and failures. In recent decades, the biggest single accomplishment is the post-1979 (post-Mao) economic growth in China. Xavier Sala-i-Martin ("The World Distribution of Income," Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 2006) finds that the number of persons below a standard poverty line fell in China by about 250 million from 1970 to 2000. This massive poverty reduction occurred despite an increase in the Chinese population of more than 400 million and rising income inequality within China. The second-best story is the economic growth in India, where the poverty count fell by around 140 million people from 1970 to 2000.

Also illuminating is the greatest tragedy for world poverty -- the low economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa. In this case, the number of people in poverty rose by around 200 million from 1970 to 2000.

These examples suggest that the key question for poverty alleviation is how to get Africa to grow like China and India. An important clue is that the triumphs in China and India derive mainly from improvements in governance, notably in the opening up to markets and capitalism. Similarly, the African tragedy derives primarily from government failure. Another clue is that foreign aid had nothing to do with the successes and did not prevent the African tragedy.

One reason for this is that foreign aid is typically run through governments and, thereby, tends to promote public sectors that are large, corrupt and unresponsive to market forces. Perhaps the Gates Foundation will run more efficient aid programs than we've seen in the past, but I wonder.

Ironically, Mr. Gates's inspiration to "give back" apparently comes from the world's second richest person, Warren Buffett, who recently promised to donate much of his fortune to the Gates Foundation.

I say ironic because one can make a much better philosophical case for a give-back of Mr. Buffett's $52 billion than for Mr. Gates's $90 billion. Mr. Buffett's money came mostly from being a good stock picker. Whether his fortune is the product of luck or skill, the social benefits are hard to pin down. These benefits have to derive from improving company management practices or investment decisions.

Of course, Mr. Gates is free to do what he wishes with his $90 billion. But I think he is kidding himself if he believes that the efforts of the Gates Foundation are likely to provide society anything like the past and future accomplishments of Microsoft. And, frankly, I would have preferred to get the $300 per person "Gates Grants."

Mr. Barro is an economics professor at Harvard University and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.

Do away with public schools

Government is inept at running schools. It should subsidize education for needy students, then get out of the way.

L.A. Times - Jonah Goldberg

June 12, 2007

HERE'S A GOOD question for you: Why have public schools at all?

OK, cue the marching music. We need public schools because blah blah blah and yada yada yada. We could say blah is common culture and yada is the government's interest in promoting the general welfare. Or that children are the future. And a mind is a terrible thing to waste. Because we can't leave any child behind.

The problem with all these bromides is that they leave out the simple fact that one of the surest ways to leave a kid "behind" is to hand him over to the government. Americans want universal education, just as they want universally safe food. But nobody believes that the government should run 90% of the restaurants, farms and supermarkets. Why should it run 90% of the schools — particularly when it gets terrible results?

Consider Washington, home of the nation's most devoted government-lovers and, ironically, the city with arguably the worst public schools in the country. Out of the 100 largest school districts, according to the Washington Post, D.C. ranks third in spending for each pupil — $12,979 — but last in spending on instruction. Fifty-six cents out of every dollar goes to administrators who, it's no secret, do a miserable job administrating, even though D.C. schools have been in a state of "reform" for nearly 40 years.

In a blistering series, the Post has documented how badly the bureaucrats have run public education. More than half of the District of Columbia's kids spend their days in "persistently dangerous" schools, with an average of nine violent incidents a day in a system with 135 schools. "Principals reporting dangerous conditions or urgently needed repairs in their buildings wait, on average, 379 days … for the problems to be fixed," according to the Post. But hey, at least the kids are getting a lousy education. A mere 19 schools managed to get "proficient" scores or better for a majority of students on the district's Comprehensive Assessment Test.

A standard response to such criticisms is to say we don't spend enough on public education. But if money were the solution, wouldn't the district, which spends nearly $13,000 on every kid, rank near the top? If you think more money will fix the schools, make your checks out to "cash" and send them to me.

Private, parochial and charter schools get better results. Parents know this. Applications for vouchers in the district dwarf the available supply, and home schooling has exploded.

As for schools teaching kids about the common culture and all that, as a conservative I couldn't agree more. But is there evidence that public schools are better at it? According to the 2006 National Assessment of Educational Progress history and civics exams, two-thirds of U.S. high school seniors couldn't identify the significance of a photo of a theater with a sign reading "Colored Entrance." And keep in mind, political correctness pretty much guarantees that Jim Crow and the civil rights movement are included in syllabi. Imagine how few kids can intelligently discuss Manifest Destiny or free silver.

Right now, there's a renewed debate about providing "universal" health insurance. For some liberals, this simply means replicating the public school model for healthcare. (Stop laughing.) But for others, this means mandating that everyone have health insurance — just as we mandate that all drivers have car insurance — and then throwing tax dollars at poorer folks to make sure no one falls through the cracks.

There's a consensus in America that every child should get an education, but as David Gelernter noted recently in the Weekly Standard, there's no such consensus that public schools need to do the educating.

Really, what would be so terrible about government mandating that every kid has to go to school, and providing subsidies and oversight when necessary, but then getting out of the way?

Milton Friedman noted long ago that the government is bad at providing services — that's why he wanted public schools to be called "government schools" — but that it's good at writing checks. So why not cut checks to people so they can send their kids to school?

What about the good public schools? Well, the reason good public schools are good has nothing to do with government's special expertise and everything to do with the fact that parents care enough to ensure their kids get a good education. That wouldn't change if the government got out of the school business. What would change is that fewer kids would get left behind.

jgoldberg@latimescolumnists.com

The Musharraf Dilemma

By MAX BOOT
June 11, 2007

Pakistan may be reaching a crisis point. Gen. Pervez Musharraf, who is chief of both the country and the armed forces, is facing the most serious threat to his rule since he seized power in 1999. His high-handed suspension in March of the chief justice of the supreme court, Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry, has galvanized opposition from the urban middle-class that had hitherto acquiesced in his rule. On May 12, street protests got out of hand in Karachi, leaving 48 dead and contributing to a sense of worsening crisis. Mr. Musharraf has since tried to regain control by cracking down on independent media outlets and by jailing hundreds of opposition political activists, but the protests continue.
The Bush administration is reaching a decision point: Will it continue to provide unqualified support for Mr. Musharraf on the grounds that he is too valuable an ally to give up in the Global War on Terror? Or will it pull the rug out from under him and insist on a transition to civilian democratic rule? In this matter as in so many others, George W. Bush should ask himself the WWRD question: What Would Reagan Do?
As it happens, Ronald Reagan confronted a crisis remarkably similar to this one 21 years ago involving another pro-American dictator in another strategically important country. Ferdinand Marcos had ruled the Philippines, home to two of America's biggest overseas military bases, by martial law since 1972. He had loyally stood by the United States and fought against a communist insurgency, but his rule started to unravel when opposition leader Benigno Aquino returned to his homeland in 1983 and was assassinated on the tarmac.
Evidence pointed to conspiracy involving Gen. Fabian Ver, commander of the Philippine armed forces. But a three-judge panel acquitted Ver and 25 others, and Marcos promptly reinstated him. He then shamelessly stole the 1986 presidential election from Benigno's widow, Corazon Aquino. Hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets to protest. "People power" was supplemented by a rebellion within the Philippine armed forces. But Marcos still had the loyalty of much of the army, and was prepared to use it to hold onto power by force -- unless the U.S. intervened.
President Reagan confronted a difficult choice. He felt personally loyal to Marcos and was afraid of the consequences of toppling him, having little confidence in Ms. Aquino's leadership abilities. Reagan abhorred the way Jimmy Carter had abandoned the Shah of Iran in 1979, and didn't want to make the same mistake.
But his Secretary of State, George Shultz, had seen early on that Marcos's legitimacy was eroding. "I became increasingly convinced that Marcos was the problem, not the solution," Mr. Shultz wrote in his memoirs. The secretary of state had refused to call for the dictator's ouster, but he had insisted that the Philippines hold elections -- demands that Marcos had finally agreed to.
The crisis came to a head on Sunday, Feb. 23, 1986, as Marcos was massing troops in Manila to crack down on the post-election protests. The top-level National Security Planning Group met that afternoon in the White House Situation Room to decide whether to continue backing him. Only White House chief of staff Don Regan offered any support for Marcos. The rest of the foreign-policy team said his day was done. The president was reluctantly won over. He authorized his friend, Sen. Paul Laxalt, to call Marcos and convey the message. By Tuesday, the dictator and his gaudy wife Imelda were on their way to exile aboard a U.S. Air Force jet.
This was no aberration. Even while protests were erupting in the Philippines, a similar situation was occurring in Haiti. Here, too, another pro-American dictator -- Jean-Claude (Baby Doc) Duvalier -- was sinking. And here, too, the Reagan administration refused to throw him a lifeline, forcing him into exile.
The Reagan administration also played a role in getting the military regime in South Korea to give up power and hold free elections in 1987. The same year, with American encouragement, Taiwan's Chiang Ching-kuo ended martial law and began the transition to democracy. The following year, again with U.S. backing, Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet held a referendum, which he lost, bringing his long reign to an end.
All these actions were taken notwithstanding the very real risk, at a time when the Cold War was still going strong, of what would follow in the wake of pro-American strongmen. Back then, just as today, lots of "realists" made the better-the-devil-you-know argument. (Henry Kissinger wrote an op-ed expressing "grave concerns" about Marcos's overthrow.) But what Reagan and especially Mr. Shultz realized was that giving a blank check to dictators was a bad deal. Sooner or later, it would lead to an explosion that would make an anti-American regime -- of the kind that arose in Nicaragua and Iran in 1979 -- more, not less, likely. The best way to prevent such a disaster was by pushing for civil-society reforms culminating in free elections, something that previous administrations failed to do with Somoza or the Shah.
The choice is made more difficult in the case of Pakistan because, unlike the Philippines or South Korea, it possesses nuclear weapons. Our ultimate nightmare is for those weapons to fall into the hands of Osama bin Laden's allies. But that is extremely unlikely. The coalition of religious parties, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, won only 12% of the seats in the legislative assembly in 2002, even though Mr. Musharraf hindered more secular parties from competing. There is no reason to think it is any more popular today. The two main opposition parties, the Pakistan People's Party led by Benazir Bhutto and the Pakistan Muslim League led by Nawaz Sharif, have their own shortcomings, including corruption and a history of dealings with Islamic radicals. But they represent the broad middle of Pakistani society, not the extremist fringe.
Moreover, Mr. Musharraf has talked a better game than he has delivered. He has taken at least $10 billion in American subsidies since 9/11, and in return he has sent his troops to fight against al Qaeda and the Taliban. But he has also struck deals with tribal authorities in South Waziristan, North Waziristan and Bajaur that essentially turn over those vital border regions to Taliban control. No wonder terrorism in Afghanistan is exploding. Taliban fighters receive training and support in Pakistan, possibly still from their historic patrons in the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency which reports to none other than Mr. Musharraf. There have even been a number of incidents in recent months of Pakistani troops providing covering fire from their side of the border for Taliban militants assaulting Afghan army positions. Mr. Musharraf has been useful, but he is either unwilling or unable to do enough to combat the terrorists in his country.
There is no need for President Bush to call for his ouster at this point, any more than Reagan called for Marcos's ouster early on. What he should do -- what Reagan did in the Philippines -- is to insist that the constitutional process play itself out. That means that, if he wants U.S. aid to continue, Mr. Musharraf should give up either the presidency or his post as army chief and allow free elections in October that could be contested by all legitimate political parties.
Reagan's words at Moscow State University in 1988 still ring true today: "Democracy is the standard by which governments are measured." Mr. Musharraf is not living up to that standard.

Mr. Boot, winner of the 2007 Eric Breindel Award for Excellence in Opinion Journalism, is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and author of "War Made New" (Gotham Books, 2006).

Bush 1, Greens 0

June 8, 2007

Just call him George W. Bush, star international diplomat. Don't snicker, don't spit out your coffee. Instead, read over the final document on climate change released yesterday by the Group of Eight.
Yes, it's a major shift in how the world will address the supposed threat of global warming. It's also largely the vision put forth years ago by none other than George W. Bush -- that international cowboy -- even if few European politicians will admit it.
Don't expect anyone to admit it. When Mr. Bush unveiled his new climate framework last week, calling on the world's powers to reduce greenhouse emissions, it was portrayed as a capitulation. He'd removed the last "obstacle" to world unity on this issue, and seen the error of his ways. At this week's Democratic presidential debate, every candidate vowed to fix the damage Mr. Bush had done to America's international reputation, his Kyoto failure the obvious example.
There's been a capitulation on global warming, but it hasn't happened in the Oval Office. The Kyoto cheerleaders at the United Nations and the European Union are realizing their government-run experiment in climate control is a mess, one that's incidentally failed to reduce carbon emissions. They've also understood that if they want the biggest players on board -- the U.S., China, India -- they need an approach that balances economic growth with feel-good environmentalism. Yesterday's G-8 agreement acknowledged those realities and tolled Kyoto's death knell. Mr. Bush, 1; sanctimonious greens, 0.
Not that the president's handling of the climate issue has been stellar. The science of global warming is still unsettled, yet Mr. Bush in 2002 caved and laid out a voluntary emissions-reduction program. Instead of getting credit, he's spent the ensuing years getting shellacked for not doing more. This has laid the groundwork for today's calls for mandatory curbs that would harm the economy. It's also given Washington an excuse to re-micromanage the energy sector. Think ethanol.
But compared to Kyoto, Mr. Bush's vision has been sublime. The basic Kyoto philosophy is this: Set ever lower mandatory targets, ratcheting down energy use, and by extension economic growth. The program was viewed by environmentalists and politicians as a convenient excuse for getting rid of unpopular fossil fuels, such as coal. In Kyoto-world, governments exist to create draconian rules, even if those dictates are disguised by "market" mechanisms such as cap-and-trade.
President Bush's approach is opposite: Allow economies to grow, along the way inspiring new technologies and new forms of energy that lower C02 emissions. Implicit is that C02-control technologies should focus on energy sources we use today, including fossil fuels. In Bush-world, the government is there to incentivize industry, coordinate with it, and set broad goals.
Take your pick. Under the vaunted Kyoto, from 2000 to 2004, Europe managed to increase its emissions by 2.3 percentage points over 1995 to 2000. Only two countries are on track to meet targets. There's rampant cheating, and endless stories of how select players are self-enriching off the government "market" in C02 credits. Meanwhile, in the U.S., under the president's oh-so-unserious plan, U.S. emissions from 2000 to 2004 were eight percentage points lower than in the prior period.
Europeans may be slow, but they aren't silly, and they've quietly come around to some of Mr. Bush's views. Tony Blair has been a leader here, and give him credit for caring enough about his signature issue to evolve. He began picking up Mr. Bush's pro-tech themes years ago, as it became clear just how much damage a Kyoto would do to his country's competitiveness. By the end of 2005, he admitted at a conference in New York that Kyoto was a problem. "I would say probably I'm changing my thinking about this in the past two or three years," he said. "The truth is, no country is going to cut its growth or consumption substantially in the light of a long-term environmental problem." He doubted there would be successor to Kyoto, which expires in 2012, and said an alternative might be "incentives" for businesses. Mr. Bush couldn't have said it better.
Or consider nuclear plants. President Bush has pushed hard for more nuclear, with its bountiful energy at zero C02 cost. This was long anathema to British and German politicians, whose populations are virulently anti-nuke and who balked at any official recognition of nuclear benefits. As Kyoto has ratcheted down other energy sources, nuclear has looked better. By 2005, the G-8 document out of Gleneagles contained an explicit acknowledgment that nuclear energy mattered. The EU's energy pact, signed earlier this year, also contained a nod to nuclear. Europe has also gone from trying to banish coal, to using tech to make it cleaner.
Then there's Mr. Bush's insistence that any "global" program must include big emitters such as China and India (Kyoto doesn't). Though it received little press, the U.S. in 2005 started the Asia-Pacific Partnership, a voluntary climate pact between it and Australia, Japan, South Korea, China and India. Unlike Kyoto -- in which a government sets a national target for emissions, and then forces a few unlucky industries to make cuts -- the Partnership gets industry execs from every sector across the table from relevant government ministers, and devises practical approaches to reductions. This parallel diplomatic approach has proved far more acceptable to countries like China, and played a role in that country's own recently released climate plan.
Pride is pride, and the Europeans haven't entirely given up on Kyoto principles. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who has spearheaded these climate talks, went into this G-8 meeting in Heiligendamm advocating binding reductions. Yet she admitted earlier this week that her plan was off the table, as the U.S. held firm.
Yesterday's declaration, far from mandatory targets, instead sets a "global goal" of halving emissions by 2050. It invites the "major emerging economies" to join in this endeavor. It acknowledges that different approaches across the world can "coordinate rather than compete." It reports that "technology is a key to mastering climate change" and lauds government "incentives." It admits that "over the next 25 years, fossil fuels will remain the world's dominant source of energy," and talks up the "peaceful use of nuclear energy." It even explains that any program "must be undertaken in a way that supports growth in developing, emerging and industrialized economies." Close your eyes, and you might think this was President Bush in the Rose Garden.
Will congressional Democrats prove as pragmatic? Even as Europeans have wised up, the left has been pushing for a Kyoto here. Should Democrats start to stumble on the difficulties, they could always ask Mr. Bush -- that new international climate ambassador -- for some advice.

Immigration Heritage

June 8, 2007

The Senate keeps grinding away on the immigration bill, making it worse this week by further restricting the guest worker provision. Majority Leader Harry Reid also seems to be walking away from the effort, calling it "the President's bill," which suggests he's preparing to blame Republicans for any defeat.
But no matter what happens this year, the immigration debate isn't going away. And among the unfortunate myths that have gathered media attention is that immigrants are a net cost to U.S. taxpayers -- that is, that they use more government benefits than they contribute in taxes.
This notion is being sold in particular by the Heritage Foundation, which once favored liberal immigration but now is pitching a study by Robert Rector claiming that households headed by low-skilled immigrants use $89 billion more in government services than they pay in taxes. We'd be worried too if this were true, but a tour of the serious economic literature shows it isn't.
The Heritage study calculates the impact only of low-skilled immigrants, those without a high school degree. This group accounts for about one-third of all U.S. immigrants. Higher-skilled immigrants are indisputably fiscal bargains because they have high earnings and pay taxes under the highly progressive American tax code. Even Mr. Rector concedes that "immigrants with a college degree become positive fiscal contributors from the outset; the taxes they pay will exceed the benefits their families receive." Raising the number of H-1B visas for computer scientists, mathematicians and other skilled immigrants should be an easy call.
Most studies also agree that the fiscal impact of the overall immigration population -- roughly 30 million people -- is also positive. In a comprehensive 1997 study, the National Academy of Sciences concluded that over their lifetimes immigrants and their children pay an estimated $80,000 more in taxes to all levels of government than they receive in benefits.
* * *
The debate is over the impact of the lowest skilled immigrants -- the 4.5 million heads of households, legal and illegal, who don't hold a high school degree. The Heritage study, which has become grist for talk radio, overstates the costs of immigrants.
First, of the estimated $19,588 of government benefits collected by low-skilled immigrant households each year, $8,462 -- or 43% -- are the cost for educating children. This leads to a strange logic. Under the Heritage cost-benefit framework, children are financial burdens to society and the surest way to balance the budget would be for Americans to stop having kids.
One of every four children born in America has an immigrant mother, but Mr. Rector is guilty of single-entry bookkeeping: He counts the costs of educating these children of immigrants but he fails to count the taxes they pay as adults. This is a major oversight because scholars have consistently shown that the children of immigrants tend to be the highest achievers and earners of all generations.
A study by economist Adam Zaretsky of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis compared the earnings and taxes of three groups: the native-born, immigrants, and the children of immigrants. He found that "Recent immigrants pay the least [taxes], but their children, who tend to make more money and live in high-income/high-tax states, pay the most."
David Card recently showed, for the National Bureau of Economic Research, that "of the 39 largest country-of-origin groups, sons from 33 groups and daughters from 32 groups have higher average educational attainment than the children of natives. . . . Evidence of the intergenerational progress of immigrants' children points to above-average levels of education even for children whose fathers had much lower schooling than native-born fathers." This is powerful evidence of the economic assimilation of the children of immigrant parents.
Mr. Rector also reports that the average low-skilled immigrant household collects $4,891 in Social Security and Medicare annually. But even conceding his figures, Social Security is a pay-as-you-go system. Retiree benefits are financed by the payroll taxes of current workers. Immigrants subsidize Social Security and Medicare because they pay taxes for 30 or 40 years without any parent collecting a monthly benefit check. This provides a one-generation net windfall -- an insight first pointed out in a 1984 study by the late economist Julian Simon and published by . . . the Heritage Foundation.
The Social Security Administration trustees agree with the original Heritage study (Simon's) and conclude in their latest actuarial report that the unfunded liabilities of Social Security "decrease with increasing rates of net immigration . . . Each additional 100,000 net immigrants increase the long-range actuarial balance by about 0.07 percent of taxable payroll."
What does that mean for the Treasury? The net present value of the net payroll taxes paid over benefits received from one million immigrants per year is just shy of $2 trillion through 2080. Even low-skilled immigrants are net contributors to the trust fund.
Heritage once made this point itself, notably in a 1998 study by economist William Beach, who calculated that Hispanics -- especially young, single males -- pay far more into Social Security than they receive over their lifetimes. Mr. Beach found that, in 1997 dollars, a typical Hispanic couple would receive $347,000 less in lifetime benefits than they pay in, allowing for a normal rate of return on payroll taxes. Maybe Heritage ought to dust off those intellectual archives, unless it's decided to bend to the fashions of the moment.
Correcting for this overstatement of retirement and education costs erases most of Mr. Rector's alleged fiscal deficit. What about the other $30 billion or so a year? Well, it turns out that about six of 10 native-born American households also receive more in government services than they pay in taxes. No one would suggest that 60% of native-born Americans are economic drains; why conclude this of low-skilled immigrants?
More broadly, the Rector study ignores that immigrants make economic contributions beyond net tax or benefit payments. One is that immigrants lower costs of production and thus reduce consumer prices, which in turn increase the real income of Americans.
A second benefit is that the labor provided by low-skilled immigrants complements the skills of native-born Americans, thus raising everyone's productivity and output. A 2006 National Bureau of Economic Research study noted that "immigrants stimulate investment, have skill sets and educational levels that complement those of natives, and do not compete for the same jobs as most natives." Immigration increased the average wages of all native-born workers in the 1990s by 1.1%, except those who did not have a high school diploma.
The President's Council of Economic Advisers recently added up all these benefits, updating the procedures used by the National Academy of Sciences, and concluded that the value of immigrants to the overall economy is a net positive $30 billion a year. Any such number is by its nature a general estimate, but the key point is that immigrants are an overall economic plus, not a drain.
* * *
A decade ago, Republicans wisely adopted a policy of "immigration yes, welfare no." It has been a great success. Welfare eligibility of immigrants was restricted and the result has been a near-50% decline in welfare use by the foreign born. If low-skilled immigrants are using too many government benefits, conservatives should be fighting to restrict welfare payments, not the immigrants.

EL TIPO DE CAMBIO REAL. PRECIOS RELATIVOS.

Del Profesor Julio por mail:

Luis: Comparto plenamente tu opinión del 7-6-2007:
“Hemos vuelto al mismo modelo de país de siempre. Un país pobre, donde los bienes son inaccesibles y los servicios muy baratos. Y nos encanta. Estamos convencidos de que este es el camino”

Te envío algunas opiniones:

Así como la cantidad real de dinero nacional no depende de la oferta monetaria sino de su demanda[1], el gobierno tampoco puede, en el largo plazo, controlar el tipo de cambio real, lo que no significa que no influya en él en el corto y el mediano plazo.

Aunque no suela ser advertido, el valor real del tipo de cambio depende exclusivamente de los precios relativos entre los bienes comercializables internacionalmente (“transables”) y los no comercializables internacionalmente (“no transables”). Un ejemplo obvio sería que, como consecuencia de un alza del dólar en un 100 %, todos los precios, salarios y tarifas, tanto de los bienes comercializables internacionalmente como los no transables, subieran instantáneamente en una proporción del 100 %; los créditos se ajustaran en un 100 % y los ingresos nominales de todo los nacionales ascendieran en igual proporción (“pass-through” de un 100%). En tal caso, no existiría ningún cambio de precios relativos, y la devaluación no produciría ningún efecto de “competitividad”. El tipo de cambio real sería idéntico.

Dado que el gobierno no puede manipular todos los valores reales, sino únicamente las variables nominales, tampoco puede fijar el tipo de cambio real. Eso no significa que no pueda inducir cambios en los precios relativos –por el contrario, toda política económica tiene por objetivo implícito o explícito provocar tal cambio- pero la efectividad de esas políticas es dudosa y de corto plazo.

Una importante distinción en la literatura económica es la que se efectúa entre los bienes comercializables internacionalmente –“transables”, en la jerga de los economistas- y los no comercializables internacionalmente.

Los bienes “transables” son aquéllos que se comercializan o pueden comercializarse en el mercado internacional, sea porque se exportan, se pueden exportar, se importan, o se pueden importar, o sustituyen importaciones. En definitiva, su precio depende del mercado internacional, menos las retenciones –impuestos a las exportaciones- más los aranceles –impuestos a las importaciones- recargos extraarancelarios, fletes y seguros, más un diferencial por los riesgos cambiarios.

Los bienes “no transables” son los que no se comercializan en el mercado internacional, ni están expuestos a la competencia internacional. Se incluyen especialmente los servicios, que en principio, y salvo casos especiales, no pueden trasladarse con facilidad fuera de las fronteras, ni a la inversa, ingresar en nuestro país.

La teoría económica y el sentido común nos indican que la oferta de los bienes transables es más elástica que la de los no transables, pues los productores de estos últimos bienes y servicios no tienen como opción, en el corto y mediano plazo, orientar su producción o sus prestaciones al mercado internacional. El precio de las locaciones, los ingresos salariales, las jubilaciones y pensiones, el costo de la medicina prepaga o no, las cuotas de los colegios, los honorarios profesionales (salvo de quienes realizan prestaciones hacia el exterior), el precio de los servicios de un peluquero que no sea de Cristina, de un taxista o de las líneas de transporte urbanas; los precios de los servicios que brinda el comercio minorista; los seguros por bienes o prestaciones del mercado interno; el costo del transporte, las comunicaciones, la energía eléctrica, en gran medida no dependen del mercado internacional, sino del mercado interno (además de que tienen precios controlados)
La inelasticidad o rigidez de la oferta de los bienes no transables tiene una consecuencia importante: al no poder aumentarse o disminuir su cantidad en el corto plazo (para traer a colación un ejemplo de mi profesión, la mayor parte de los abogados no tenemos como opción prestar nuestros servicios en el exterior, por el hecho de que nuestros ingresos se reduzcan; ni a la inversa, es factible “importar” abogados chinos por un precio menor[2]) el precio en el corto plazo está comparativamente más influido por las condiciones de la demanda que por los costos, a diferencia de lo que sucede con los bienes no transables. En épocas de bonanza se produce una reasignación de precios relativos a favor de los bienes no transables, y a la inversa, con una devaluación, los bienes no transables ven disminuido su valor relativo. Por ejemplo, desde Enero de 2002 los precios al consumidor ascendieron un 85%, conforme a los índices oficiales; y los precios mayoristas, casi el 200%. Esa notoria divergencia se explica, además de por la manipulación estadística, porque los precios al consumidor tienen una mayor incidencia de bienes y servicios no transables.

Los bienes transables están regidos por la “ley de un solo precio”: más allá del corto plazo, su precio está fijado por el mercado internacional. Como consecuencia de una devaluación, tienden a subir en una proporción similar al aumento del tipo de cambio, menos las retenciones y la incidencia de otros gravámenes. No puede haber divergencias de largo plazo en el precio de bienes transables, en el mercado interno e internacional: los productores de bienes exportables no los venderán en el mercado interno, por un precio inferior al que pueden obtener en el mercado internacional; a la inversa, los bienes importados se cotizarán a un valor igual al que resulte de multiplicar su valor en divisas extranjeras, por el tipo de cambio, más los aranceles y demás recargos arancelarios y extraarancelarios derivados de la importación.

Existen bienes transables que son un componente importante del costo de los no transables, por constituir insumos o bienes de capital para la producción de estos últimos: verbi gratia los servicios médicos son en principio no transables, pero los tomógrafos y equipos de alta complejidad son importados. La incidencia en el precio de los no transables, derivado de ese mayor costo, dependerá de la elasticidad de la demanda de los bienes finales[3] y de la incidencia dentro del costo marginal[4] de aquéllos.

Pues bien: ¿qué ocurre en escenarios distintos, con los precios de los bienes no transables?

Como el precio está influido en gran medida por la demanda, los efectos serán disímiles:

* Una devaluación genera, en el corto plazo, una reasignación de recursos, precios relativos e ingresos a favor de los bienes transables.

En el largo plazo, ese efecto no puede ser perpetuo. Supongamos una devaluación exitosa desde la perspectiva de sus propulsores: los precios al consumidor no aumentan o aumentan poco; los salarios reales se reducen; se produce un auge de las exportaciones y un considerable incremento del producto bruto. Además, se produce un “shock” de confianza, fluyen las inversiones financieras y no financieras hacia el país, se reduce la tasa de interés, aumenta el precio de los títulos argentinos y se reduce el “riesgo país”; la moneda se estabiliza, aumenta el crédito y milagrosamente, lo es en moneda nacional.

Todos esos fenómenos tienden a que los bienes no transables –entre los que se encuentran los servicios- vuelvan a subir, en relación a los transables: su oferta es más rígida, y por la misma razón que inicialmente bajaron en términos relativos –es decir, frente a los comercializables internacionalmente- suben como consecuencia del tirón de la demanda. La reducción de la tasa de interés y la confianza en que esa reducción se mantendrá, provoca el renacimiento del crédito, y con ello, el alza en los precios de los inmuebles, lo que arrastra hacia arriba los precios de la construcción. La desocupación comienza a descender, y los salarios en dólares aumentan, pues la confianza hace que las monedas extranjeras –ya caras después de su devaluación- no sean consideradas una alternativa de “cobertura” frente a la incertidumbre. El superávit inicial del comercio exterior da un tirón adicional a la demanda global, y la afluencia de dólares, motivada por el superávit comercial, por el flujo de inversiones y por la confianza, hace que el tipo de cambio permanezca relativamente estable frente al alza de los precios de los bienes no transables y servicios.

En un plazo mediano, tanto los dependientes del sector privado como los del sector público presionan por salarios mayores –rezagados como consecuencia de la devaluación inicial- y finalmente los obtienen. En el largo plazo, el cambio de precios relativos inducido por la devaluación no puede ser continuo si la economía crece y la confianza refluye.

Si en cambio la devaluación no logra sus objetivos, si aumenta la desconfianza, si continúan la falta de crédito y la recuperación no es suficientemente enérgica, es probable que el cambio de precios relativos provocado por aquélla se mantenga durante largo tiempo, pero eso no sería una señal de éxito, sino de fracaso. En la década de 1980 –considerada con razón una década perdida desde el punto de vista del crecimiento- la inflación mayorista –con una importante incidencia de bienes transables- superó a la inflación minorista –en la que los precios de los bienes no transables y servicios tienen mayor incidencia porcentual- considerablemente; en otras palabras, no hubo “atraso” cambiario. El importante “adelanto” cambiario de 1989 coincidió con una inflación sin precedentes en la historia nacional.[5]

Cabe señalar que en todas las economías desarrolladas, el precio de los servicios, de los inmuebles y de las locaciones ha tendido a subir respecto de los precios de los bienes no comercializables internacionalmente, por la apuntada rigidez de la oferta de éstos.
En Estados Unidos, Europa, Japón y más recientemente Corea del Sur, Taiwán, Hong Kong, Singapur, los servicios son cada vez más caros, y los bienes transables cada vez más baratos. En los países subdesarrollados, los servicios –en términos comparativos- son baratos, y los bienes, caros en relación a los ingresos medios de la población.

En otras palabras, los países ricos o con economías crecientes tienden a experimentar “atraso” cambiario, y los países pobres o con economías en que los capitales fugan, gozan de las virtudes de un dólar alto.

En definitiva:

* El tipo de cambio real no depende de sus valores absolutos, sino de la relación de precios entre los bienes comercializables internacionalmente y los no comercializables internacionalmente.

* La flotación conduce a la devaluación en un entorno de desequilibrios entre la oferta y la demanda de moneda nacional.

* Los desequilibrios en nuestro país son provocados por el déficit fiscal, que provocan un aumento en la base y en la oferta monetaria.

* En condiciones de flotación cambiaria, los aumentos en la oferta monetaria y la reducción de la demanda de dinero generada por las expectativas permanentes de inflación y devaluación, generan una presión alcista sobre el tipo de cambio.

* La devaluación provoca una reasignación de precios y recursos a favor de los bienes comercializables internacionalmente, pero ese efecto no puede ser perpetuo, si las exportaciones y la economía crecen.

* Si las condiciones de incertidumbre y recesión se mantienen, el tipo de cambio real (tipo de cambio nominal deflactado por el índice de precios al consumidor) se mantendrá alto, pero eso dista de ser una virtud.

* Si por el contrario, la devaluación es exitosa, genera fuerzas en el mediano y largo plazo tendientes a un nuevo “atraso” cambiario, por el efecto combinado de una alza de precios de los bienes no transables mayor a la de los transables, y eventuales caídas inclusive en términos nominales del valor del dólar y divisas extranjeras.

Tipo de cambio real y nominal. Su vinculación con la confianza (demanda de dinero nacional) y el crecimiento

Si la permanente depreciación nominal de nuestro signo monetario fuera una condición para crecer, nuestro país adoptó desde hace años esa fórmula mágica: un peso equivale a diez billones de pesos moneda nacional.

Tampoco un tipo de cambio real elevado genera, por sí, el crecimiento de las exportaciones, ni del producto e ingreso nacionales. La década del 80 se caracterizó por un elevado tipo de cambio real, que encontró su cúspide en el año 1989. Los precios al consumidor y los salarios nominales subieron menos que el dólar estadounidense, por lo que el país se tornó más barato en dólares, sin que se incrementaran significativamente las exportaciones. En cuanto al crecimiento del producto bruto interno, fue una década lamentablemente perdida.

Por el contrario, todas las evidencias empíricas y teóricas indican que cuando la economía crece, cuando afluyen capitales y refluyen los expatriados, cuando renace la confianza en el sistema financiero, el tipo de cambio real tiende a caer, pues aumenta la oferta de divisas extranjeras y a la vez se reduce su demanda.
En la época del impetuoso crecimiento de Japón, mientras se convertía en un gran exportador, el yen se revaluó considerablemente frente al dólar estadounidense. Lo mismo cabe decir de Alemania y el marco alemán.

La depreciación en términos reales de la moneda significa salarios reales bajos. Sólo se puede mantener el tipo de cambio alto en términos reales, manteniéndose la pobreza y la huida del dinero nacional. Cuando la economía crece, vuelve la confianza y aumenta el ahorro, el tipo de cambio real deja de ser elevado, aunque la autoridad monetaria insista en mantener su nivel en términos nominales[6].

Aunque esa proposición es de sentido común y puede ser aprehendida intuitivamente, desarrollaré una demostración formal.

Sabemos que:

M.V = P.Q = PNB

Donde
M = oferta de moneda.
V= velocidad de circulación.
P= nivel de precios.
Q= producto bruto real (cantidad producida) = ingreso real (y) (provisoriamente, se prescinde de las importaciones y las exportaciones).

PNB = producto nacional bruto en términos nominales.

Convencionalmente, a las variables nominales, se las identifica con letras mayúsculas, y a las reales, con minúsculas.

Dado que el producto nacional bruto, en términos nominales, es el ingreso real por los precios (P.Q = P.y), la variable P (nivel de precios) es:

M.V = P
y

La velocidad de circulación es la inversa de la demanda de moneda (Md) por lo que la ecuación puede ser reemplazada así:

M.V = PNB; ergo: V= PNB/M; V = P.y/M; P = MV/y.

Como V/y = P/M,

y/V = M/P;

además 1/V= demanda nominal de dinero (k).

M.V = P.y se puede expresar de otra forma, con la clásica ecuación de Cambridge

M = k.y.P; sustituyendo k por 1/V es decir:

P = M/k.y

Dado que k.y es la demanda real de dinero:

P= M/md

El nivel de precios es función directa de la oferta nominal de dinero (M), e inversa de la demanda real de dinero (md )

Respecto de los precios internacionales, rige la misma identidad. Las magnitudes externas se expresan con asterisco, para diferenciarlas de las internas:

P* = M*
Md*

Ya se vio que la demanda real es k.y; y a la vez, es M/P, por lo que
k.y= M/P.

Respecto de los bienes transables, internacionalmente rige la ley de un solo precio:

P = XP*

Es decir, los precios domésticos son iguales al tipo de cambio (X) multiplicado por los precios internacionales. La ecuación puede ser expresada igualmente:

X = P/P* (tipo de cambio es igual a la relación entre los precios internos y los precios internacionales, respecto de los bienes transables.

Sabemos que P= XP*
P = M/md; y P*= M*/(md)*

En consecuencia:
M = X. M*
md (md)*

Como md= k.y; md*= k*.y*

La igualdad anterior se convierte en
M = X.M*
k.y k*.y*

Despejando X:
X= M.k*.y*
M*.k.y

El nivel del tipo de cambio es, entonces, función de las tasas relativas de crecimiento de la cantidad de moneda nacional (M) y extranjera (M*); de la demanda de dinero en el extranjero (k*) y en el país (k) y del ingreso real en el extranjero (y*), y en el país (y).

Es decir, que será más elevado el precio de la moneda extranjera tomada como referencia, cuando más aumente la oferta monetaria doméstica (M) relativamente a la oferta de la moneda referencial (M*); y más reducido, cuando mayores sean la demanda de dinero (k) y el ingreso (y) en el país.

Un país que crece más que el extranjero (aumenta el ingreso real y más que y*), y que la demanda de dinero (k) aumenta por el incremento de la confianza en el país y en su estabilidad monetaria y jurídica, experimenta un revaluación de su moneda. Si el tipo de cambio es fluctuante, se apreciará en términos nominales, por los que los precios de los bienes transables caerán respecto de los precios de los bienes no transables (que no se reducirán, o lo harán en menor medida); si el tipo de cambio es fijo, dado que los precios de los bienes transables se mantendrán alineados con los precios internacionales, también la moneda nacional se valorizará, pero en términos reales: los precios de los bienes no transables aumentarán relativamente a los transables.

A la inversa, un país que tenga expectativas de inflación superior a la inflación extranjera sufrirá una tendencia a la depreciación de su moneda, pues la demanda (k) se reducirá. El público disminuirá la demanda de dinero nacional y en casos extremos, huirá de esa moneda, generando procesos hiperinflacionarios[7].

Pero "si las cosas van bien" –lo que en principio deberían desear siempre las autoridades- es incongruente pretender un "dólar alto" o "tipo de cambio elevado", que sólo puede mantenerse en un escenario de fracaso: si aumenta la confianza en la estabilidad monetaria, y crece la economía, el dólar, euro y demás monedas –que ya están caras en términos reales- tenderán a reducir su valor en términos reales, sea porque existirá apreciación nominal del peso, o porque la cotización de las monedas extranjeras se mantendrá o ascenderá menos que la suba de los precios de los bienes no comercializables internacionalmente.

Posible explicación del énfasis en el tipo de cambio elevado
Cuando la economía está azotada por la inflación elevada o por la hiperinflación, la percepción social y de los dirigentes políticos, es que el problema principal es ése. Lamentablemente en Argentina, la inflación sólo se percibe como problema en los estadios terminales.

Desde mediados de la década del 90, se insistió en que nuestro país se estaba desindustrializando, lo que distaba de ser cierto (la producción industrial es aún hoy, en pleno auge del "modelo productivo", inferior, o en todo caso, no muy superior a la de 1997). Igualmente, se convenció a gran parte de la comunidad que nuestro mal era el "neoliberalismo" que siguió al "consenso de Washington", razón por la cual, si la década demonizada se identificaba con el dólar "bajo", su contrafigura –no sólo económica, sino como definición política- tenía que ser forzosamente el tipo de cambio elevado. No sólo porque se considera que fomenta la competitividad, sino porque nos aísla de la comunidad internacional: nada de viajes al exterior, propios del período maldito; nada de facilitar los estudios de personas que tienen la pretensión de perfeccionarse en el imperio del mal. El aislamiento económico favorece el aislamiento cultural.

Es increíble, pero gran parte de los economistas pertenecientes al arco que se define como "progresista" –que en las décadas del 60 y el 70 tenía claro los terribles efectos sobre la distribución del ingreso de las hiperdevaluaciones- aplaude un esquema que sólo puede mantenerse con la pobreza de los asalariados y productores de servicios. Que hoy sea "progresista", es una particularidad más de nuestra particular Argentina.

Los efectos patrimoniales de una devaluación seguida de pesificación
Una de las tragedias de nuestro país, ha sido la falta de reconocimiento de la importancia de la protección del derecho de propiedad[8]. Salvo algunas voces numéricamente poco significativas, los análisis anteriores al año 2002 ni siquiera se preocupaban por la fenomenal destrucción de riqueza financiera que provocaría una devaluación seguida de la pesificación compulsiva de los créditos.

La hiperrecesión de 2002 estuvo provocada, en gran medida, por la destrucción de los activos líquidos de muchísimos argentinos y extranjeros. El hecho de que muchos libremente eligieran el dólar como moneda de sus ahorros no debió haberse constituido motivo de tratamiento legal desfavorable, máxime la historia de inflaciones, confiscaciones y falta de respeto del derecho de propiedad. La pesificación sólo afectó a quienes confiaban en las instituciones argentinas; no a quienes tenían sus ahorros líquidos en el exterior, ni en cajas de seguridad.

Esos fenómenos de desconfianza o escasa confianza en la moneda local se han dado en diversas economías emergentes o incluso medianas, sin que pueda considerarse afectada la soberanía por el hecho de que hayan eventualmente hayan renunciado a su propia moneda y a tener una política monetaria propia. Cuando las economías relativamente menos desarrolladas de Europa, como Italia, España, Grecia y Portugal se incorporaron a la zona del Euro, se redujeron las tasas de interés de esas naciones al nivel de Alemania, y sus economías se vieron beneficiadas, no perjudicadas, por el hecho de no poder depreciar sus monedas para obtener una poco duradera competitividad basada en la devaluación.

Pero, ya que se devaluó, la brusca trepada de la cotización de las monedas extranjeras que siguió al abandono de la convertibilidad se hizo mayor, porque no se respetó el derecho de propiedad. La convalidación del esquema pesificador –que se aplicó no sólo a los depósitos bancarios en dólares, sino también a los títulos públicos que no estaban sometidos a la ley extranjera- generó una destrucción inmensa de riqueza financiera, y una desconfianza tan marcada, que gravitará como hipoteca sobre nuestra economía por años.

Esa destrucción de riqueza financiera no se tradujo en tasas de interés mayores, por distintos motivos:

* Porque la masiva confiscación coexistió con un período de tasas de interés internacionales muy bajas. Dado que las tasas domésticas son iguales a las tasas internacionales, más los riesgos cambiarios y jurídicos, el país ha gozado de un contexto internacional excepcionalmente favorable, cuya duración es impredecible.

* Porque la reducida demanda de crédito ha impedido que las tasas activas crezcan significativamente.
La recuperación de los niveles de producción y empleo –por cierto que a partir de un subsuelo- tenderá a aumentar las tasas de interés en el corto plazo. En el largo plazo, el crédito casi no existe, ni existirá mientras impere la inseguridad jurídica, y la tendencia secular de nuestro país sean las elevadas tasas de inflación.

________________________________________
[1] Partiendo de la ecuación de Irving Fisher: M.V = P.Q = PNB; V = PNB/M; 1/V = M/PNB; la velocidad de circulación (V) es inversamente proporcional a la demanda de dinero (1/V); por lo que la cantidad real de dinero (M/PNB) depende exclusivamente de su demanda.
[2] Inclusive en los que económicamente pueden hacerlo, el arraigo en la tierra que se ha conocido y el amor por ella, el costo no sólo económico sino también emocional, personal y familiar del desarraigo, son elementos que determinan la relativa inmovilidad del factor trabajo y de los servicios en general.
[3] La elasticidad de la demanda es una medida de la reacción de la cantidad demandada, frente a cambios en el precio, y se traduce en la fórmula )Q/Q/)P/P, donde la letra griega ) (delta) simboliza los cambios; Q, es la cantidad; y P, el precio.
[4] El costo marginal es el incremento del costo total, derivado de incrementar la producción en una unidad. Si en vez de tomar incrementos discretos, utilizamos las herramientas del cálculo diferencial –incrementos continuos- se simboliza como: )CT/)Q, cuando )Q tiende a cero.
[5] JUAN CARLOS DE PABLO, Macroeconomía, cuadro 17 –inflación- pág. 185.
[6] En la actualidad, el banco central ha adoptado como política, con la bendición del ministerio de economía y del propio presidente, mantener elevada la cotización del dólar estadounidense, en un nivel de aproximadamente 3 pesos= 1 dólar.
[7] Así ocurrió en forma manifiesta en 1985, 1989, primeros meses de 1991 y primeros meses de 2002.